THE PEOPLE vs. COLLINS.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

I th Supreme Court of Micigan.
THE PEOPLE VS. COLLINS.
1. The power of enacting general laws cannot be delegated by the legislative body
even to the people from whom all govermental powers originally emanated. Per
DoUGLAss, J., all the judges assenting.
2. Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the "act prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating
beverages and the traffic therein"approved Feb. 11, 1853, are voidr because an
attempted delegation of legislative power to the people. Per Wno, PRATT,
DouGLAss and CoPXLAnb, JJ.
3. Powers of local legislation or rather powers of administrative legislation are not
within the principle, and may be delegated; neither are enactments in the nature
of propositions where mere acceptance calls the law in force.

This case came into the Supreme Court on a reservation by the
Presiding Judge of Wayne Circuit Court of the question whether
"an act prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating beverages and
the traffic therein" approved Feb. 11, 1858, was constitutionally in
force.
On the question the court were equally divided.
GREEN, 0. J. and WHIPPLE, MARTIN and JOHNSON, Justices, held
the affirmative.
WING, PRATT, DOUGLASS and COPELAD, Justices, held the negative.
PRATT, J. delivered a writen opinion in which he reviewed the
authorities at great length, but all the, judges holding the negative
concurred in the following opinion, delivered by
DOUGLASS,

J.-This is an action of debt to recover the penalty

for selling ardent spirits, prescribed by "an act prohibiting the
manufacture of intoxicating beverages and the traffic therein," dpproved February 11, 1853. (L. 1858, p. 100.) The offence is
alleged to have been committed on the 19th day of December last;

and the question presented is, whether at this time those provisions
of the act which prescribe the penalty and the mode of recovering
it, were in force.
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The 18th, 19th and 20th sections of the act provided that a vote
of the electors of the State should be taken at the time and in the
manner prescribed, and that in case a majority of the votes cast at
such election sbould.be in favor of its adoption, the "1act should be-.
come a law of this State from and after Dec. 1, 1853" if against its
adoption, it" should take effect and be.come a law of this State from
and after March 1, 1870." An election was held in June last in
pursuance of these sections, and resulted in a majority in favor of
the adoption of the law. If the act is in force (except the sections
mentioned) it took effect as a law, in v~tue of this popular vote, on
the 1st of December last.
We are of the opinion that it never has been constitutionally put
in force.
In establishing a government the will of the people is sovereign.
They may organize such government, invest it with such powers,
confer those powers upon such agents, or reserve them to themselves
as they may deem most conducive to their own welfare.. But when
they have adopted a written constitution of government, all, collectively as well as individually, are bound by it. The various
powers of the government must be exercised by those in whom the
constitution vests them or co.ntemplates they may be vested. No act
of the government can emanate from any other source, not even
from the people themselves. The people have such control over its
action through the right of suffrage, or otherwise, and such right to
participate in the exercise of its sovereign powers as they reserved
to themselves, and no other.
The constitution of 1851 vests the legislative power in this State,
in a Senate and House of Representatives. Art. 4, Sec. 1. This
article confers the entire supreme legislative power upon these two
bodies, except in a single instance. Art. 15, Sec. 2, declares that
no banking law shall have effect until- approved by a majority of
the electors of the State. In this instance, the people have reserved
legislative power to themselves. All other legislative power in this
State must be exercised by the Legislature, or by those to whom
they have constitutionally delegated it.
The Legislature may delegate this power in those cases where the
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constitution authorizes and contemplates it, and in no others. All
our American constitutions, State and Federal, contemplate or expressly provide for local self government. They go upon the principle of leaving matters of purely local concern to the control of
those directly interested. Counties, townships, cities and villages,
with powers of local legislation, have always existed among us. Our
forefathers brought with them from the mother country these municipal institutions, which have performed so important a part in the
development of modern civil liberty, by preventing the centralization of power. Their existence, in perhaps every State, has preceded
the adoption of written constitutions. All those constitutions assume
their existence and contemplate that they will continue to exist, and
may fairly be held to imply that the ordinary powers of legislation
with which they have always been vested may, as occasion shall
require, be conferred upon them.
Our own constitution provides that Counties and Townships shall
be bodies corporate, with such powers and immunities as shall be
prescribed by law. Art. 10, See. 1; Art. 11, Sec. 2. and Art.
4, Sec. .38, declare what is clearly to be inferred from numerous
other provisions, that the Legislature may confer upon organized
Townships, incorporated Cities and Villages, and upon the baards
of supervisors of the several Counties such powers of a local legislative and administrative' character as they may deem proper.
Powers of local legislation, then, may be delegated to these municipal bodies because it is authorized, and as we conceive for no
other reason. And in the case of- Townships, Cities and Villages,
the fundamental law being silent on the subject, these powers may
be vested in the people of these bodies or in persons chosen by the
people. This is a matter in the discretion of the Legislature.
Whether in any case they can be vested in the people of a County
instead of the board of supervisors, in this State, it is unnecessary
to determine. Probably they may; certainly so in those States
whose constitutions designate no persons within the County upon
whom such powers are to be conferred.
But even in the cases referred to, only powers of legislation over
miatters of local concern can be delegated. If the Legislature should
38
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attempt to invest the boards of sfipervisors with power to enact the
entire civil and criminal codes which should be in force within their
respective Counties, this would manifestlybe in violation of the true
intent and spirit of the constitution. Bice vs. Foster,4 Harr. Del.

R. 477; Parker vs. Commonwealth, 6 Barr, 509. But see also
Bancroft vs. .Dumas, 21 Verm. R. 555.
That the Legislature may confer upon others in their discretion
administrative powers necessary or proper for carrying on the
government, not otherwise vested by the constitution, and in some
cases involving the exercise of a discretion which the Legislature
itself 'might but could not conveniently have exercised, no one will
-question. These, however, are not law-making powers, and there:fore do not here require particular notice.
But the power of enacting-general laws cannot be delegated,-not even to the people. There is nothing in the constitution which
:authorizes or contemplates it;- nothing in the nature of the power
-which requires it; nothing in the usages of our American Governments which sanctions it; no single adjudication of a court of last
resort in any State which affirms it; and such delegation wouk4 be
-contrary to the intent'manifested by the very structure of the legis•lative department of the government.
While the power and the responsibility of Legislation remain
where the constitution has placed them, before any proposed
-measure can become a law, it must first struggle for ascendency at
the ballot box amid the numerous issues involved in allpolitical contests. It must pass through the ordeal of public and deliberate discussions in the Legislature. It must receive the sanction of the
concurrent votes of a majority, or, having been returned with the
Governor's vetoi of two-thirds of the members of the two Houses of
which the Legislature is composed,-votes cast by men who are not
the mere deputies of their immediate constituents, but the'representatives of the whole people and bound to act for the general goodwho are responsible to the people for their action and may be held
to that respofisibility. . Public opinion will prevail- and pass into
public law, but it will be enlightened, deliberate, permanent and
organicallyexpressed public opinion. It is this opinion al6ne 'hich
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the constitution designed should govern. Such a government secures
deliberation and responsibility in Legislation, and affords protection
against the despotism of official rulers on the one hand, and of irresponsible numerical majorities on the other. It has been appropriately termed the "flower of modern civilization."
But if the Legislature may transfer this power and this responsibility to the people, where are the checks which the constitution intended to provide against hasty and inconsiderate legislation?
Where are the securities against arbitrary and irresponsible power?
We may be subjected to the dominion of the popular majority of
the hour-a majority whose opinion must be formed without legislative discussion or deliberation-a majority responsible to one because
it has no superior-impatient of restraint, because conscious of its
strength and apt to think itself infallible, and against whose resistless will thus exercised directly on matters of legislation, with an
elective judiciary, all the restraints" which the constitution has imposed upon legislative power, will, in the end, p~ove utterly unavailing.
In short, ifthis power ma be delegated to the people, then, by
the action of one of its departments, this representative goverment
may be transformed into a collective democracy-the only such
democracy practicable where the people are too numerous to assemble en,masse-namely: a democracy in -hich a select body propose
the laws, and the people adopt or reject them. No such revolution
can be effected in the nature of this government without either a
change or a violaiion of the constitution.
The Legislature, then, connot delegate power of legislation in
reference to general laws. On this point, it is believed that the
members of this court are all agreed. We are not aware that any
jurist in this country has ever expressed a different opinion.
Nobody makes a question that the act of Feb. 12, 1853, is a
general law.
If so* it is clear that it is not now the law of this State, unless
made so by the legislature, in -whom the power of legislation in refeto general laws is exclusively vested.
We are of the opinion that, although it may be a valid act to take
effect in 1870, the legislature have never yet put it in force; and
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that sections 18, 19 and 20, and the popular vote under them, are
void, because an attempted delegation to, and exercise of legislative
power by the people in violation of the Constitution.
As one-half the membeis of this Court do not concur in this opinion, we must be pirdoned if, in order to make our views more
clearly understood, we. recur to principles and definitions somewhat
elementary Ii their nature.
All power proceeds from, and its exercise implies the exertion of,
intelligent will. Its different kinds are distinguished by the nature
of the end which'this will is exerted to accomplish, and of the discretion which its exertion implies. Legislative power is the power
of pre8cribingrules of civil conduct, or, in other words, of enacting
laws. Its possession imposes the duty of judging what laws arq
expedient, and what are inexpedient. Its exercise consists in the
expression of will as to what laws shall be in force, founded upon
this judgment. "A statute," says Chanc.elor Kent, "is the express
written will of the legislature, rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities." 1 Kent Com. 447. Its enactment
always implies the judgment of the legislature that i is expedient.
There certainly can be no statute law which is not the will of the
law makers, implying this judgment as to its expediency.. And
every. expression of this will, implying this judgment, which is the
proximate cause of an obligatory rule of civil conduct, is clearly an
exercise of legislative power.
Now, when the legislature makq the taking effect of an act depend
upon the approval or disapproval of others, what is the nature and
effect of their action ? They do not themselves will that the act
shall become a law, but merely that it shall be referred to the will
of others to determine whether it shall become a law or not. Their
action does not imply their judgment that the law would be expe.
dient, but merely that it is expedient to refer the question of the
expediency of the law to the judgment of others. They do not,
therefore, exercise the power and the discretion necessary to enact
the law, or, in 'other words, to make it an operative rule of conduct,
but they confer upon others identically the same power, and impose
the duty of exercising the same discretion which they themselves
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would have exercised if they had enacted it. They merely propose
a law to be adopted or rejected by others.
This seems to us most clearly a delegation of legislative power.
Probably no doubts would ever have arisen on this subject, were
it not for the indirect manner in which the delegation is made. But
there is obviously no difference in principle between making the
taking effect of an act depend upon the approval or disapproval of
others, and conferring in express terms the power of legislating on
the same subject. The only difference there can be is in the extent,
not in the nature of the power delegated. Thus, if the Legislature
should pass an act prescribing the manner in which the streets of
Detroit should be paved, and make its taking effect depend upon
the approval of the Common Council, this mode of legislption would
confer upon the Common Council power of the same nature as that
which would be conferred by an act authorizing them to prescribe
the mode of paving streets. The only difference in the two cases
is that, inthe former, the power of the Common Council is limited
to the adoption or rejection of a law proposed to them; in the latter,
they are at liberty to adopt whatever law they choose on the same
subject. Again, by the common law, which prevails in most of the
States, the owner of cattle running at large is liable for any damage
-which they may occasion to others; but it is sometimes expedient
that a different rule should prevail in particular townships, owing
to peculiar circumstances. Suppose, this being a general law, the
Legislature should'pass an act declaring that cattle might run at
large in a particular township, without such liability of the owners,
to take effect on a vote of the people of the township in its favor.
Such a law would confer upon the people, substantially the same
power as a law authorizing them to enact a by-law to the same
effect. And most clearly the latter would delegate power of local'
legislation.
Legislative power may be conferred upon small bodies, like the
Common Council of a city, or the people of a township, in either of
the modes referred to; but it is obvious that the only practicable
mode of delegating it to the people of a county, or of the whole
State, is by legislative acts, to take effect upon their approval. For
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the people, either of a county or State, are too numerous and too
widely dispersed to assemble en masse, -and act as a legislative
body. They can only exercise legislative power, by adopting or
rejecting laws proposed by the Legislature, who alone can invest
them with the forms and solemnities by which laws must be authenticated. It is for this .reason, that the people reserved to themselves
legislative power, in reference to banking laws, in the only way
they could reserve it, when they provided in the constitution that
no such law should have effect, until approved by a majority of the
electors of this State.
We are now prepared to examine the act under consideration.
No one will contend that it is the law of this State, except. so far as
it expresses the will of the Legislature, and is not in conflict with
the constitution.
But it does not express their will that-any of its provisions, except sections -18, 19 and 20, should take effect before 1870; nor
does its enactment imply their judgment as to the expediency of its
taking effect at an earlier period. It might have passed the Legislature in its present form, although every member thought it inexpedient that it should become a law. The sections mentioned provide for taking a vote of the people upon the question, whether or
not the act should take effect at an earlier period, namely, on the 2d
of December, 1853, and declare that it should then become a law,
if a majority of the votes cast should be in favor of it. The vote of
the people expressed heir will and their judgment, that it was expedient that it should become the law of this State on the day last
mentioned.
If the act (except the sections mentioned) is now in force, who
exerted the power which put it in force ? Certainly not the Legislature. They merely clothed it with the forms and solemnities, by
which laws must be authenticated, and conferred upon the -people
the power to put it in force in December, 1853. Without the exercise of this power by the people or some further act of the Legislature, it must hlave remained withoiit vitality until 1870. Clearly, it
is the will of the people, expressed, by their votes in June, which
has put it in force. And that will was directed to the game end,
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implied the exercise of the same discretion, and was therefore of
the same nature as the will which the Legislature would have exercised, if instead of sections 18, 19 and 20, they had enacted these
words: 1 This act shall become a law from and after December 1st,
1853." This was legislative will. The power of putting a law in
force by its exercise was legislative power. The sections of the act
which purported to confer it, if valid, delegated legislative power to
the people, in the only way in which, as we have already shown, it
was practicable to delegate it. And the act, if in force, is so only
in virtue of the exercise of this delegated power.
It seems to have been supposed by some that the constitutional
objection which might exist, to a submission of the question, whether
the act should take effect at all, might be evaded by submitting the
question, whether it should take effect at one or the other of two
periods of time, separated from each other by an interval of seventeen years. But there is obviously no difference in principle between the two cases. The determination of the latter question
would just as clearly be an act of legislation, as the determination
of the former. We do not understand the counsel for the people to
insist, or any member of this court to be of the opinion that there
is any distinction between them. Indeed, the former was the real
and substantial question submitted by the act of 1853. No great
respect is due to the sophistry, which dictated the form of it, and
which assumes that a constitutional objection to an unqualified submission might be eviaded by submitting the question, -whether an act
should become a law presently or in the next generation. Obviously
the same result would be accomplished by the one mode of legislation as by the other. It is the thing done, and not the mode of
doing it, which is material. A constitution which could be evaded
by such a,subterfuge would scarcely be worth the paper on which it
is written.
The conclusions at which we have arrived, namely, first, that the
power of legislation in reference to general laws is vested exclusively
in the Legislature and cannot be delegated; and secondly, that the
taking effect of such laws cannot be made to depend upon the result
of a popular vote upon the question, whether or when they shall
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take effect, because this would be a delegation of such power; from
which it necessarily results that the act in question has never yet
been constitutionally put in-force, are fully sustained by the decision
of the Supreme Court of Delaware in BRice vs. Foster, (4, Harr. Del.
R. 477,) of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Parker vs. the
Commonwealth, (6. Barr, 509,) decisions of different Supreme Courts
in New York, only one of which, Bradley vs. Baxter, (Am. Law Reg.
Sep. 1853) is yet reported and finally by the unanimous decision of
the Court of Appeals of that State in Barto vs. Himrod, decided in
July, 1853. The New York cases all involved the question of the
validity of the School Law of that State, which was submitted to
the people for adoption or rejection, and no attempt has been made
to distinguish them from the case before us. The same views were
expressed by. Stuart, J. in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Indiana in Maize vs. the State, decided in November last,
but they were not necessary to the determination of the base then
before the Court. Such weight of authority against the validity of
a species of legislation which all know is of recent origin, could
scarcely be expected, and if the case before us was far less clear
upon principle than it is to our minds, we should hesitate long before
we ventured to dissent from the views of the eminent jurists who
have preceded us in the consideration of this subject.
There is but one contrary decision, and that is in the case of
Johnson vs. Rich, (9 Barb. S. 0. R. 680) decided by the Supreme
Court of New York, for the 7th District, three judges being present,
and one dissenting; and the case has been overruled by the Court
of Appeals, in Barto vs. tUimrod already referred to.
In the People vs. Beynolds (1 Gilm. 1) the Commonwealth vs.
Quarter Session (8 Barr. 391) and the Commonwealth vs. Painter
(10. id. 214) laws special and local in their nature, which were made
to take effect upon the vote of the people of the counties or*townships interested, were held valid. Perhaps these cases were all
correctly decided upon the principle we have already explained at
some length, that powerB of local legislation maybe delegated. We
concede, however, that the Courts by whom they were respectively
decided, do not place them distinctly upon this ground, but rather

THE PEOPLE vs. COLLINS.

upon the ground that the power conferred in each case was administrative and not legislative in its nature. Whatever explanation
may be given to them, one thing is certain, they expressly.concede
that general laws cannot be made to take effect upon the result of
a popular vote. This concession is distinctly made in the People
vs. RBeynolds, and the" two remaining cases were decided by the
same court which had previously decided Parker vs. the Commonwealth, with the express avowal that it was not the intention to
overrule it.
Not only are the conclusions at which we have arrived, in accordance with the almost unbroken current of authority, but they are
consistent with all the established usages of legislation. We are
not aware that in a single instance a general statute has been acquiesced in as valid, which was made to take effect upon the exercise
by others of the same will and discretion the Legislature would
have exercised if they had made its taking effect unconditional, and
which consequently in our view delegated legislative power. Most,
if not all, of the instances of this kind of legislation to which we have
been referred were laws relating to matters of local concern, made
to take effect upon a vote of the people of a township or county in
their favor, and in our view valid.not bbcause legislative power was
not delegated, but because, in those cases, the Legislature had
authority to delegate it. ' Many other instances referred to were
laws which, as they came from the hands of the Legislature, were
valid enactments ii the nature of propositions, and the popular vote
was a mere acceptance of the terms proposed (like the acceptance
of an act creating a private corporation), and therefore not an exercise of legislative power at all. Such was the vote of the convention upon which the admission of this State into the -Union, was
made to depend by the act of Congress of June 15, 1886. An attempt to refer to the various laws cited would lead to great prolixity.
There is one instance, however, of what may be termed general
legislation, which requires notice. It has been urged that upon the
principles we maintain, the Constitution of 1851, has never been
adopted; for the Convention which framed it, submitted it to the
people to determine whether it should take effect or not. If the
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Convention had power to enact the Constitution at all without submitting it to the people, which may well be doubted, we are clearly
of the opinion that they were authorized to delegate this power to
the people, and most unquestionably they did so by the submission,
for certainly it was the people who, made it the fundamental law.
There was nothing in the Constitution of 1836, or in the nature
and objects of the Convention, inconsistent with such a submission.
That constitution merely provided for the calling of a Convention
when two-thirds of each branch of the Legislature should think a
revision necessary, and a majority of the people voted in favor of it,
but did not prescribe the powers or duties of the Convention when
called. It did not provide that the power of revision should he
vested in the Convention (Art. 12, § 2). And as constitutions are
always in theory the direct expression of the will of the people, and
in nearly every instance in this country have been adopted by them,
there can be no doubt that the submission of the present Constitution to the people was in entire accordance with the true intent of
the Constitution which it superseded.
Those of our brethren who are of the opinion that the law in
question is now in force, concur in the views expressed by the court
in the overruled case of Johnson vs. Bich, before cited. They hold
that an act may be made to take effect upon the happening of any
future event, certain or contingent; that when such an act takes
effect it does so in virtue solely of the will of the legislature which
prescribes the event and its power, and therefore no legislative
power is delegated. And they are of the opinion that this was a
valid statute to take effect upon the happening of a future contingent event: namely; the result of a popular vote.
Unquestionably, no legislative power is conferred by an act, the
taking effect of which is made to depend upon the happening of
some future event which is a mere change of circumstances upon
which the expediency of the law in the judgment of the law-makers
depends, such as a change of the seasons, or a hostile invasion.
For, in such a case, mqst clearly the will of the Legislature puts
the law in force. No other will is exerted to that end. The event
is the mere occasion, not the cause of its coming into effebt. The
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Legislature do not refer it to others to determine whether it shall
become a law or not. And on the question of the expediency of
the law they exercise their own judgment definitely and finally.
They do not appeal to others to judge for them as to its present or
future expediency.-They exercise the will and the discretion which,
in the case of general laws the constitution makes it their duty to
exercise. No legislative power is conferred by those provisions of
the act which prescribe the event, and make it the occasion of the
taking effect of the. law (it is absurd, to speak of prescribing the
power of such an event,) because the event implies no exertion of
intelligent will in determining whether it shall take effect or not.
But where the taking effect of an act is made to depend upon a
future event which, like the popular vote in this case, is a mere exercise and expression of the same will and the same judgment as to
the expediency of the law, which the Legislature would have exercised if they had enacted that the law should take effect uficonditionally at the time specified, how can it be said that the law comes
into force in virtue of the will and the judgment of the Legislature ?
The event itself is an exercise of the will of the people, which determines the very question -whether the law shall take effect or not.
How can it be said that the Legislature determine it? We trust
we have already shown that it is the will of the people, and not of
the Legislature which makes the act a law; that the people and not
the Legislature decide as to its expediency; and that becaus6 the
event itself is a mere exercise of legislative will and discretion, those
provisions of the act which, "prescribe the event and its power,"
delegate legislative power.
That reasoning which overlooks the wide distinction between the
making an act to take effect upon the happening of an event which
is, and one which is not a mere exercise of legislative will and dis-cretion, and infers that because legislative power is not delegated, in
the one case, it is not in the other, is surely fallacious.
Unquestionably it is true that the Legislature may enact a valid
law to take effect upon the happening of any future event certain
or contingent, which does not involve the exercise by others of that
legislative will and discretion which they cannnot constitutionally
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delegate to them the power of exercising. Thus far the doctrine
that laws may be made to take effect upon future events extends,
and no farther.
Finally, if it is true, as all concede, that power of legislation in
reference to general laws cannot be delegated to the people, because,
if this were so, by the action of one of its departments, this representative government might be transformed into a democracy in
which the Legislature merely propose the laws and the people adopt
or reject them, then is it not clear that the act in question is not
constitutionally in force ? For call it a law to take effect upon a
contingency, or a law delegating legislative power,-call it what we
will, this is certain, that in substance and effect it was merely proposed by the Legislature, and, if their vote had any validity, adopted
by the people;

Mississippi Court of Appeals.

October Term, 1858.

JAMiES M. LYON vs. JOHN KNOTT ET UX. 1
1.

fississvpi Act of 1889. Marital rights. Statutory llmitations.-The statute of
M ississippi of 1839, which secures to a married *oman certain property in her
own right, is a limitation of the marital rights of the husband, as they existed at
common law, but does not restrict such rights beyond the express and positive
language of the act, or by necessary implication therefrom.

2. Marital rights. Succession or distribution.-Thefuture right of the husband to the
property is a right incident to the contract of marriage, as regulated by law; the
husband does not succeed to the slaves of the wife, held by her under the statute,
as an inheritor or distributee of her separate estate, but they vest in him under the
law, and by virtue of the contract of.marriage.
3. Remainder%, Vested- Contingent.-The uncertainty whether a remainder will
ever take effect in possession, will not prevent it from being a vested remainder,
provided the interest be fixed. It is the present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant, which distinguishes a vested
from a contingent remainder. Therefore, though children may be born of the
marriage, or the wife may survive the husband, yet the right of the husband to
the slaves of the wife, undei the statute, is vested by the marriage, as he is from
'Reported by Mr. Attorney General GLENx.
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that time clothed with a present capacity of taking, though his right may be defeated or intercepted by events subsequently occurring.
4. Statute. Contract of Harriage.-Bythe law of Mississippi, the rights of the husband rest on the same foundation as a title acquired by purchase, and for their
extent Courts will not look beyond the contract of marriage. .
5. Lez loci contractus. .arriage.-The contract of marriage is not made an exception to the well-settled rule of the common law, that the law of the place where
contracts are entered into, unless made with a view to performance in another
place, is to determine the relative rights and obligations of the parties.
6. Laaw of the domicil. Present property. Future acquis'tion.-Where there is no
express contract, the law of the matrimonial domicil will govern as to all the
rights o the parties to their present property in that place, and as to all personal
property everywhere, and the same rule holds good as well to future acquisitions
as to present property, when there is no change of domicil; but when there id
such change, th6 law of the actual, and not of the matrimonial domicil will prevail as to future acquisition of movable property.
7. Comity. International law.-National comity being a principle of the law of
nations, constitutes a part of the civil jurisprudence of every State. Therefore,
when the rule is settled by which the right is to be determined, and which would
prevail in the Courts of this State, where the contract was entered into, we ascertain the rule by which, under the "jus gentiam privatum," the tribunals of a
foreign State would be guided in determining the rights of the parties arising out
of the contract.
8. Conflict of laws. Lez loci contractus.-Hence,though by the laws of Texas where
the wife died childless, her next of kin succeed to her separate property, yet, as
by the laws of Mississippi, where the contract of marriage was had in such event,'
the husband is entitled; in the conflict upon principles of settled law his rights
must prevail.'

Appeal from the Superior. Court of Chancery.
The case stood on bill and demurrer. The facts are as follows
briefly. In 1840 James M. Lyon entered ifito a contract of marriage with Melissa Speed, in the State of Mississipi. Upon marriage said Melissa was.entitled to a large number of negroes in her
separate right, which were reduced into possession by Lyon, her
husband. When the parties entered into the contract of marriage,
they had their domicil in Mississippi, where they continued to reside
for a long while, and after they had possession of said slaves. The
contracting parties then removed to Texas, where Mrs. Lyon died,
leaving no children. Lyon then removed the slaves to Mississippi,
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vhere, in 18,49, this bill was filed. Knott and wife sue for the
slaves. Mrs. Knott was the sister of Mrs. Lyon, and claims under
the Texas law of distribution, which directs that where a married
woman having separate property dies, leaving no children, her next
of kin are entitled. Lyon, the husband, surviving, claims by virtue
of his marriage contract and the laws of Mississippi.
The sections of the Married Woman's Law of Mississippi, 1839,
involved, are the second and fourth. The second gives her the
right to hold separate property free from the debts or contracts of
her husband. The fourth provides,
"In case of the death of the wife, such slaves descend and go to
the children of her and her said husband jointly begotten, and in
case there shall be no child born of the wife during such her coverture, then such slaves shall descend and go to the husband and to
his heirs."-Code, 497.
The Chancellor overruled the demurrer, and Lyon appealed.
Mr. Attorney General Glenn, for appellant, insisted that under
the act the husband's right to the negroes was vested, and that, on
principles of comity, the law of the place where the contract was
made should govern, and not the law of Texas, where Mrs. Lyon
died.
On the first point, he relied on Fearne on Cont. Rem. 1, 4
Kent's Com. 203, Ma1horner vs. Booe, 12 Smedes & M. 276, and
cases cited.
Upon the second, he cited and commented on Story's Confl. of
Laws, § 186, 187, 146 to 156; Burge Com. Col. and For. Law, as
quoted; 17 Martin's La. R. 603; Kneeland vs. _Ensley', Meigs'
Tenn. R. 127, and Gurland vs. Bowan, 2 S. & M. 617.
George L. Potter, Esq., for appellee.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SMITH, Ch. J.-This. bill wag filed in the Superior Court of
Chancery, to recover certain slaves, claimed by the appellee, Mrs.
Knott, under the law of the State of Texas, regulating the descent
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and distribution of personal property. A demurrer was filed to the
bill, which was overruled, and an appeal taken to this Court.
The facts alleged in the bill are as follows, to wit: The defendant, Lyon, intermarried with Mrs. Melissa Speed, in the month of
April, 1844. The marriage was celebrated in Copiah county, in
this State, where both parties were then domiciled. Mrs. Speed,
-who was the widow of John Speed, deceased, at the date of the
marriage was entitled to a number' of slaves, as the distributive
share of her deceased husband's estate. Those slaves, which are
now the subject of controversy, were within a slort time after the'
marriage, received and reduced into possession -by Lyon and wife.
About one year afterwards, Lyon, taking with them the slavesi
removed with his wife from Copiah county, to the State of Texas,
where they became domiciled, and where they continued to reside
until the death of Mrs. Lyon, which occurred in 1847. Mrs. Lyon
died intestate and without issue, leaving no brother or sister'except
the complainant, Mrs. Knott, who as next of kin under the Texan
law, was entitled to the slaves belonging to her succession as sole
distributee, and in exclusion of her husband, Lyon. After the
death of his wife, Lyon, with the fraudulent intention, as it is
alleged, of defeating the rights of complainants, removed the slaves
into this State. Since their removal, he has sold a part of thetn,
and refuses to deliver the remainder.
As it is manifest that the transfer of the slaves from the jurisdiction
of Texas to that of Mississippi, has in no respect affected the rights
of either party, those rights, whatever they are, exist now precisely
as they did, upon the death of Mrs. Lyon. Hence, if under the
statute of descents and distribution of the State of Texas, a title to
the slaves vested in Mrs. Knott, the courts of this State will, upbn
a principle of national comity, to which there are but few exceptions, enforce that title precisely as it would be done in the courts
of the former.
It is admitted, if the marriage had taken place in Texas instead
of Mississippi, that Lyon's marital rights would not have attached
to the slaves, which would have gone to Mrs. Knott as next of kin,
and the person entitled to the succession under the law of that
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State. But, although Lyon and wife had their domicil in Texas at
the time of the death of the latter, the marriage, as we have seen,
was celebrated in this State. Hence arises the question, whether
the laws of Mississippi regulating the rights of husband and wife,
or the Texan law of descents and distribution, is to. determine the
rights of the parties to the slaves in controversy.
It is very manifest, if Lyon under the law of this State, by his
marriage with Mrs. Speed, acquired no fixed or vested right to her
slaves, which he reduced into his possession, which would not terminate on her death; that they did upon her death constitute a portion
of her distributable estate; and which in its disposition, is to be
controlled by the laws of Texas.
Upon this hypothesis the decree of the Chancellor was undoubtedly correct.. On the other hand, if Lyon by this marriage was
vested with a fixed right or interest in the slaves which, upon the
death of his wife without issue born of the marriage, would devolve
upon him the absolute title in fee simple, that upon the well understood rules of national comity, the slaves ought not to be regarded
as belonging to the estate of Mrs. Lyon, and, consequently, not
subject to disposition under the Texan statute of descents and distributi6ns. Our first subject of inquiry is, therefore, the character
an d extent of the interest or rights to the slaves in controversy,
which vested in Lyon under the law of this State and by virtue of
the marriage.
Prior to the passage of the Act of the 15th February, 1839, for
the preservation and protection of the rights of married women, the
common law rule, without modification, existed, by 'which the husband upon the marriage became vested with the absolute right and
title to all the personal property of the wife in her possession at the
time of the marriage, or which he should reduce into possession
during its continuance. By that statute a very material change
was made in the marital rights of the husband in regard to the personal estate of the wife, consisting of slaves. By the second section
it was provided, that "when any woman possessed of a property in
slaves shall marry, her property in such slaves and their natural
increase, shall continue to her, notwithstanding her coverture, and

JAMES M. LYON vs. JOHN KNOTT ET UX.

that she shall have, hold and possess the same as her separate property, exempt from any liability for the debts or contracts of the
husband." And by the fourth section, "that the contract and
management of all such slaves, the direction of their labor and the
receipt of the productions thereof, shall remain to the husband
agreeably to the laws then in force. In case of the death of the
wife, such slaves shall descend and go to the children of her and
her husband jointly together; and in case there shall be no child
born of the wife during such her coverture, then such slaves shall
descend and go to the husband and his heirs." Hutch. Dig.
496-7.
The provisions of this statute have been frequently the subject of
comment and construction in this court; but no case has arisen in
which the character and extent of the rights acquired by the husband, under its operation, in the slaves of the wife, have been ascertained and established by a deliberate and direct adjudication. The
case of Clark vs. H'Crarey, 12 S. & M. 847, was referred to in
the argument as having a direct and important bearing on the question under examination; but we do not perceive that it has any
relevancy whatever to the question of the husband's interest in the
slaves. In that case the marriage of M'Crarey with Mrs. Clark,
occurred before the enactment of the statute. A right in action to
the slaves afterwards the subject of litigation, existed in Mrs. Clark
at the time of her marriage with M'Crarey; but M'Crarey did not
reduce them into -his possession until after the statute went into
operation. The question, therefore, was not as to the nature or
extent of the interest which the husband acquired by a marriage
under the Act, in the slave property of the wife, but whether the
property enured to the separate use of Mrs. Clark under the statute,
or whether the possession acquired after its adoption, vested the'
title absolutely in M'Crar.ey. The determination of that question
necessarily depended upon the right or title which the husband at
common law acuired, to the ehoses in action, and personal property
of the wife not in her possession at the time of the marriage. And
it was held that the interest acquired by the husband in the wife's
thoses, was not a right which was absolutely in him, but which was
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an inchoate or qualified right upon condition that he reduce them
into possession during coverture; and hence as the law was passed
before the condition was performed, the right of the husband in that
case was intercepted.. In the case of Kell vs. Fowler, 14 S. & M.
68, it was strongly but in very general terms intimated, that the
husband by a marriage contracted under the Act of 1839, did not
acquire a vested right in the slave property of the wife. But in
that case, the decision turned exclusively upon the marriage contract which had been entered into by Fowler with Mrs. Kell, prior
to their marriage. The late Chief Justice who delivered the opinion
of the Court, observing that "it was unnecessary to consider the
effect of the Acts of 1839 and 1846, in relation to the rights of
married women. This contract (the marriage contract,) is the law
of the case. But if these Acts alone controlled the case, the result
would probably be the same, as the husband had no such vested
interest under the Act of 1839, as that claimed for him.'"
The case of Clark vs. M' Orarey, is referred to as authority for
the intimation thrown out by the court. It is very manifest that
this opinion was expressed without any very careful examination of
the subject, and without -a deliberate purpose of settling the construction of the act in reference to the question. For these reasons,
we do not feel authorized to repose upon thie authority of that case
as settling its construction, in reference to the rights of the husband.
In King vs. Marshall,24 Miss. Rep. 85, the clause of the 4th
section, which gives slaves, after the death of the wife, to the children born of the marriage, was regarded strictly in the light of a
statute of descents and distribution, under which no rights vested in
the children during the life of the wife. And hence, that it was
competent for the Legislature to alter or repeal it so as to change
the -rule of descent at any time before the death of the wife.
As there are no heirs to the living, the rights of heirs and distributees arise from the death of the ancestor. Until that event
occurs, the children have no vested interest in th? estate of their
ancestor. The only interest they have is the right to inherit and
possess his estate, of which he shall die seised, and of which he has
made no valid testamentary disposition, according to the"laws of
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descent which may then be in force, no matter how different or contrary thereto those laws may have been when the estate was acquired. If it be true, therefore, as maintained in argument, that
the act which defined the right of the husband,. acquired by marriage under it, to the slaves of the wife, if simply an ordinary statute
of descents, those rights are not vested absolutely. The interest of
the husband thus acquired, if it can be regarded as a right at all,
in the proper sense of the term, is not only conditional, but is imperfect and inchoate. The interest is of precisely the same nature
and extent as the interest of the children of- the marriage during
the life of the wife.
lIt is true that the same language is employed in providing for
the descent of'the slaves to the children of the marriage, wt~ch is
used in defining the rights of the husband, to the property after the
death of the wife, where she dies without issue. In the one case it
is provided that the slaves "shall descend and go to the children of
the husband 'and wife jointly begotten." In the other, they "d e scend and go to the husband and his heirs."
If we do not, therefore, look beyond the words of the clause
containing this provision, to the subject matter and objects of the
act, the question is one of very easy solution. We would be compelled to adopt the same construction which has been put upon the
clause in reference to the children of the husband and wife jointly
begotten; to hold that the property does not vest in the husband,
upon the death of the wife, by virtue of his marital rights-; but that
he takes it as special heir to the wife; having acquired by the marriage no other or greater interest than a right to inherit the property, provided the law regulating the descent shall remain in force,
and the conditions arise, which are specified in the act. But we
apprehend that the rights of the husband, arising under the act,
stand on a different foundation, and are different in character 4nd
extent from those of the children born of the marriage.
Marriage, at common law, operated as an absolute gift to the
husband of the personal chattels of the wife in her possession at the
time. The choses of the wife when reduced into possession during
coverture, became equally his absolute property. Hence, upon the
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consummation of the marriage, the whole personal property of the
wife was instantly liable for the debts of the husband, and subject
to his unlimited right of alienati6n. It might be transferred without consideration to strangers, wasted in folly and extravagance, or
lost by misfortune. In either case the law offered neither assistance
nor protection. However ample the fortune which the wife,.upon
the marriage, brought to the husband the law made no provision
out of it for her support, or the support and maintenance of the
children of the marriage. This was the evil which the Legislature
designed to provide against by the adoption of the statute. To
effect the purpose of the Legislature in the manner proposed, it was
necessary to enlarge the privileges and capacities of femes covert to
acquire and to hold property in their own right as separate estate;
and as a necessary consequence to abridge in a corresponding ratio
the marital rights of husbands. The capacity to acquire and hold
property conferred upon femes covert, and the separate estate in
her slaves secm'ed to the wife, was so much deducted from or carved
out of the rights of the husband at common law, arising out of the
contract of marriage. Upon 'the clearest principle, therefore, those
rights of the husbafid are not to be considered as restricted or abrogated; unless by the express and positive language of the statute,
or by necessary implication'-Although the husband was entitled,
absolutely, to the usufruct in the slaves, by the express provisions
of the statute, they remained to the wife as her separate estate, and'
in the event of children being born of the marriage, they descend to
them. The married right of the husband, in virtue of which he
would have been vested with the absolute title of the slaves, was
that far and only. that far, taken away and suspended. No right of
present enjoyment attached as to the ultimate fee in them. But it
is manifest, according to the recognized rules of construction, if
nothing further had been said in reference to the disposition of the
property, that upon the death of the wife, without joint issue of her
and her husband, he would take it by virtue of the jus mariti. The
general effect And operation of the act was to suspend rather than
to unconditionally repeal the rights of husbands as they then existed.
Upon this view, the last clause of tle 4th section, which provides,
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upon the death of the wife without issue of the marriage, that the
slaves "descend and go to the husband," secures no right, which
without the provision, the husband would not have been entitled to.
There is no reason arising out of the purpose and objects which it
was the intention of the Legislature to accomplish, which would render it consistent and proper that the husband should take the slave
property of the wife, upon her death, as an inheritor or distributee,
instead of succeeding to it as a right incident to the contract of
marriage as regulated by the law. There is certainly one circumstance which plainly distinguishes the right of the husband from the
interest of the children born of the marriage, or which children
generally, before the death of their ancestor possess in his estate.
The interest of the children, as we have seen; before the death of the
wife, is in no sense of the term a vested right. But whether the
husband takes the slaves held by the wife as her separate estate, by
inheritance or not, it cannot be doubted that by virtue of the marriage under the act, he acquires a right in reference to the slaves
which is of a fixed and definite character, and of which he cannot
be deprived without his own consent. For these reasons, we think
that the husband does not succeed to the slaves of the wife, held by
her under the statute, as her separate estate by inheritance; but
that they vest in him, under the law and by virtue of the marriage.
Our next inquiry is, whether the title or interest acquired by the
husband, to the slaves of the wife is a fixed and vested right. And
if upon inqjuiry, it shall be found to be of that character, there will
be no pretence for saying that the title of iyon to the property in
controversy, was intercepted by the statute of descenti and distribution of Texas, where, as we have seen, Lyon and wife had their
domicil when Mrs. Lyon died; and hence that the property constituted a part of her succession, and was as such subject to distribution, according to the laws of that place.
It is a matter frequently attended with difficulty, to determine
whether a right is vested or contingent. The lines of distinction
(says Chancellor Kent,) between vested and contingent remainders,
are so nicely drawn, that they arc difficult to be traced, and in some
instances, a vested remainder would seem to possess the essential
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qualities of a contingent estate." Without attempting to trace
these lines, or to discriminate between the nice shades which distinguish the boundaries of estates which are vested from those which
are contingent, it will be sufficien't to refer to the more general rules
which distinguish between vested and contingent estates. Mr. Fearne
defines a vested right 'to be an immediate fixed right of present or
future enjoyment. Fearne on Rem. 1.
Chancellor Kent says, an estate is vested when there is an immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of future
enjoyment. 4 Kent Com. 202. An estate or use is said to be in
contingency, whenever it is uncertain whether the estate or use
limited to take effect infuturo, will ever vest; but according to the
same authority, the uncertainty whether the remainder will ever
take effect in possession, will not prevent it from being a vested
remainder, provided the interest be fixed. It is the present capacity of taking effect in possession, if the possession were-to become
vacant, that distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder. 4
Kent. Com. 203.
If the fee in the slaves which would go to the husband,. in case
the wife should die without children jointly together by .her and her
husband, be regarded as an. estate in remainder, to take effect upon
the death of the wife, according to strict technical principles, the
interest of the husband in the slaves acquired by marriage, would.
be a vested right. It is manifest that that interest or right, whatever it be, is fixed. The remainder may never take effect in possession. The husband may die before the wife, or the wife may
die leaving children of the marriage; but that uncertainty does not
prevent the remainder from vesting, as the interest is fixed by the
marriage, and the right vested to have the estate on the terms prescribed in the statute.
This is still more evident, if the statute be held not to repeal
uncoaditionally, but to suspend the marital rights of the husband.
Upon that viev, the interest of the husband is clearly a present
fixed right of future enjoyment.
If a remainder be limited upon an .estate tail, it will be held to be
a vested remainder. For example, if a devise be made to A. and
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the heirs of his body, and in default thereof to B., the remainder to
B. is vested. 4 Kent, 203, note; Let us suppose that a bequest
be made to the wife of A. B., of an estate in slaves, of precisely the
character and extent with that which a feme covert holds in the
slaves which she owned at her marriage; with remainder to the
children jointly by herself and husband, and in default thereof to
the husband, A. B., if he should be the survivor. We would have
then the exact terms of the statute embraced in the devise. In
such case, it would be uncertain whether the remainder to the husband A. B. would ever take effect in possession; for children might
be born of the marriage, or the wife might survive the husband;
but as the interest of A. B. would be fixed, and a present capacity
to take effect, ipon the death of the wife without issue, would exist,
according to the most respectable authority, the remainder would
be vested in A. B. 4 Kent Com. 204, note.
If the marriage in Mississippi had operated as an absolufe conveyance of the slaves in controversy to Lyon, there would be no
ground to contest his right to them. The Courts of no State in
Christendom would look beyond the contract of marriage, if the
effect of that contract were the investiture of the husband with the
absolute title to the property of the wife, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the property in contest was the property of the
wife prior to the marriage. The title of the husband in such case
would stand on the same foundatioti with a title acquired by purchase or inheritance. But the interest with which Lyon was vested
by the marriage, was not the absolute and unqualified title to the
property, but only the usufruct for life, with a right to it in fee, in
case Mrs. Lyon should die leaving no issue of the marriage. Mrs.
Lyon died without issue, and Lyon, undoubtedly, according to the
laws of this State, was entitled to the slaves.
We come then to the question-and it is the only one remaining
in the case-whether Lyon's right arising under the laws of this
State should be recognized by the Courts of Texas, or whether, disregarding them, the property should descend and be distributed
according to the laws of that State.
The question here presented has never been directly adjudicated
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in this court, and we are uninformed whether or not it has ever
been passed upon by the Courts of Texas. It is one of those questiowi arising upon the conflict of the laws of different States, which,
as properly remarked by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the
case of Saul's Heirs vs. Ris ereditors, are frequently the most embarrassing and difficult of decision of any that can occupy the
attention of Courts of Justice. The discordant opinions of commentators upon this branch of jurisprudence, and the conflicting
decisions of judicial tribunals, have left it in a condition, at best, of
great doubt and uncertainty. But the question under consideration
is one of the few, in relation to marriage, and its incidents arising
upon the conflict of laws, about which it appears there is greater
uncertainty of opinion [among jurists, and less conflict in the decisions of Courts, than is found to exist generally in reference to
questions of that character.
The contract of marriage has not been made an exception to the
well understood rule of the common law; that the law of the place
where contracts are entered into, unless they are made with reference to performance in another place, is to regulate and determine
the relative rights and obligations of the parties making them;
although many very important exceptions have been engrafted upon
the rule. Where parties contracting marriage have entered into an
express ante-nuptial contract, that contract will, of course, furnish
the rule which will govern in regard to matrimonial property;- and
will, upon recognized principles, be carried into effect in every jurisdiction; subject, of course, to the exceptions which are applicable
to all other classes of contracts.
It has been held by many eminent jurists, that where a marriage
has been contracted, without an express marriage contract, the parties are presumed to have contracted with reference to the law of
the country in which the marriage was celebrated; and that the law
regulating the institution of marriage and its incidents, being personal and not a real statute, this tacit contract follows them into
any other jurisdiction. . And hence it has been holden that not only
the property possessed by them in the matrimonial domicil, but
such property as they possessed elsewhere, or might have'acquired
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after removal from the matrimonial domicil, would be governed by
the laws of the country where they were domiciled at the time of
the marriage. Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin, N. S.. 599. Story
Confl. of Laws, c. 6, s. 157.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case above cited, of Saul
vs. His Creditors, after an elaborate and very profound investigation of this subject, dissented from this doctrine, so far as it relates
to the property acquired after the removal from the matrimonial
domicil. Judge Story concurs in that opinion with the Supreme
Court of Louisiana. But that Court while refuting the doctrine
which applies the tacit contract, which is assumed to attena the
fact of marriage, to 1property acquired subsequently to the removal
from the jurisdiction in which the parties were domiciled at the time
of the marriage, announced the true rule to be, "that 'where there
is no express nuptial contract, the law of the matrimonial domicil
is to govern as to the antecedent property. Saul vs. His Creditors,
5 Martin, N. S. 605-606. Core vs. Davis's Heirs, 4 Martin, 545.
Le Breton vs. Nouchet, 3 Id. 60.
Judge Story has given his unqualified approbation to this doctrine. He says, "in general, the doctrine thus maintained in Louisiana, .-will most probably form the basis of the American jurisprudence on this subject. They have much to commend them in their
intrinsic convenience and certainty: and they seem best to harmonize with the known principles of the common law." The following
propositions, amongst others, are laid down by the learned judge,
as those which, although not universally established in America,
have much of domestic authority for their support, and none in
opposition to them. "When there is no express contract, the law
of the matrimonial domicil will govern as to all the rights of the
parties to their present property, in that place, and as to all.personal property everywhere, upon the principl that movables, have
no situs, or rather, that they accompany the person everywhere.
And where there is no change of domicil, the same rule will apply
to future acquisitions, as to present property. But where there is
a change of domicil, the law of the actual domicil, and not the
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matrimonial domicil, will govern as to all future acquisitions of
movable property." Story on Confl. L. c. 6, s. 183-186-187.
In the case of Kneeland vs. Barly, Meigs, 620, these principles
appear to have been fully *recognized and unanimously adopted by
the Supreme Court of Tennessee. They possess the high merit of
convenience and certainty, and seem to harmonize well with the
rules of the common law in reference to other classes of contracts.
These rules have been sanctioned by the most learned jurists, and
the ablest judicial tribunals, and we yield to them our approval.
Lyon's right to the slaves in controversy originated in a contract of
marriage, which was solemnized under and governed by the laws of
this State. And those rights are to be adjudicated upon it in
its Courts. The laws of every State have force only within the
limits of its own government, and bind all who are subjects thereof,
but they p6ssess no extra territorial force or jurisdiction. The
The laws of Texas regulating descents and distribution, have, therefore, no operation within the jurisdiction of Mississippi, except upon
a principle of national comity; but comity being a principle of the
law of nations, may be said to constitute a part of the civil jurisprudence of every State, which claims to belong to the community
of civiliied nations. It is upon that ground that we liave noticed
the claims of the appellees arising under the Texan laws. And in
determining the rule which according to the jus gentlum privatum
would govern the question under consideration, and which would
be adopted by the Courts of this State, we necessarily ascbrtain the
rule which would be applied to the subject by the Courts of Texas.
For not being informed, whether the rule of decision on this subject
has ever been settled in that State, we must presume that the same
rule would be adopted by her Courts, which has been applied by
this. Court. This cause is before us upon a re-argument, and after
a careful re-examination of all the questions involved in the controversy, we have reached the same conclusions which we did on the
previous occasion.
Let the decree be reversed and. the bill dismissed.
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In the Supreme Court of Alabama.- June Term, 1853.
WINSTON Vs. WESTFELDT.

1

1. The doctrine of lispendens does not apply to negotiable paper.
2. An injunction in force against the negotiation of a note, does not destroy its
negotiability.
3. An endorsee who acquires a negotiable note before maturity, bonafide, and for
valuable consideration, without notice, is not bound by a decree in a chancery suit
to which his endorser was a party, although he acquired the note after the rendition of the decree.

Error to the Circuit Court of Mobile.
Tried before the HON. Lymz

GIBBONS.

Assumpsit by George Westfeldt against Augustus A. Winston,
on a promissory note for $2,156 10 executed by said Winstou and
others, dated June 13, 1848, payable three years after dateto the
order of Jonathan Bliss; negotiable and payable at the Bank of
Mobile. The plaintiff declared as endorsee of said Bliss.
The facts proved on the trial, were substantially as follows: The
Tombigbee Bank of Mississippi held a claim against one Lacy, which
was in the hands of Jonathan Bliss for collection. This claim was
compromised, and the note now sued on was received in part payment of it, Lacy being one of the makers of the note. The Tombigbee Bank failed, and made an assignment of its ssets to one
Murdock, to whom Bliss delivered the note in suit, having endorsed
it in blank; and, before its maturity, it came to the hands of Westfeldt by purchase; but from whom he purchased, does not appear.
Before Westfeldt's purchase, however, certain creditors of the Tombigbee Bank had instituted proceedings in the Chancery Court of
Sumter, to condemn the amount due on the notes received by Murdock from Bliss to the satisfaction of their debts. The bill sets out
the compromise of Lacy's indebtedness to the Bank, and alleges tfiat
the assignment to Murdock.was fraudulent. Lacy, Bliss, Murdock
and the Bank are made defendants to the bill; and an order was
made, in the progress of the cause, enjoining the transfer by Bliss
IWe are indebted to the kindness of the reporter of Alabama, J.W. Shepherd,
Esq., for this report.
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of Murdock's notes. Service was perfected on the defendants; and
and a decree was rendered, condemning the notes, and directing the
master to ascertain and report the amount due from Lacy to the
Bank, and from the Bank to the complainants. The master's report under this reference was made and confirmed; and in pursuance of this decree,.Lacy paid to the complainants the amount of
the note now sued on, having been indemnified. Westfeldt purchased the note on the 16th of March,,1850, a few days after the
confirmation of the master's report, and while said chancery suit
was under an order of continuation for further proceedings as to
other parties.
Upon this state of facts, the court charged the jury, that the
plaintiff was entitlcd to recover. Several other charges were also
given, which it is unnecessary to state, as the opinion of the court is
based upon this single charge, which is assigned for error.
Hopkins and Jones, for plaintiff in error:
1. Chancery has jurisdiction to restrain, by injunction, the transfer and negotiation of bills of exchange and other negotiable paper.
2 Story's Equity, 238, §"906 ; ib. 289, § 908; Eden on.Injunctions,
ch. 14, 210,211; Chitty onBills, 119, 120; Hood vs. Aston, 1 Russ.
412. And the effect of this must be, to destroy its negotiability;
otherwise, the remedy would be incomplete. 1 Russ. 412; 9 Wheat.
738, 845; 7 Vesey, 418.
2. Westfeldt is not, in law, a bona fide holder; he is a holder
with notice, being a purchaser pendente lite. Lis pendens is notice
to all the world. "Whoever purchases property pendente lite, takes
it subject to any decree which may be made in respect to it in the
pending suit." 6 Barbour, 188 ; 2 Leading Cases in Equity (White &
Tudor's) 154 to157;
etealf vs. P.lvertoft, 2 Vesey & B. 200;
Murray vs. Ballou, 1 Johns. Oh. 566; Harrisvs Carter,8 Stewart
238; C]iaudronvs. Magee, 8 Ala. 570 ; Boller vs. Carter& Womack,
9 ib. 921. The doctrine of lis pendens also existed in the civil law.
Droit Rom. 117; Merlin's Repert.
8. The decree being rendered by a, court having jurisdiction, it is
conclusive until reversed, whether right or wrong. It cannot be
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collaterally impeached. .icharson vs. Hfobart, 1 Stewart, 500;
TFyman vs. Campbell, 6 Porter, 219; Cole vs. Connolly, 16 Ala.
280; Savage vs. Benham, 17 ib. 119; Coz vs. Davis, ib. 714; Lightsey vs. .Harris,20,ib. 409.
4. Westfeldt being the endorsee of Bliss, and claiming as such,
the decree against Bliss is conclusive against him. A judgment or
decree is conclusive against parties or privies. 1 Starkie on Ev.
194, 219; 17 Mass. 367; 6 Porter, 219; 18 Ala. 241.
5. When things are shown, at any time, to have existed in a certain state, they are presumed to continue so until the contrary is
shown. The note is shown to have passed to Murdock in March,
1848, and it must be presumed to have remained in his possession.
until Westfeldt 'acquired it. Best on Presumptions, 186, (47 Law
Library 119;) 3 Starkie on Ev. 1252.
6. A party cannot. contradict, by evidence, a fact which he has
alleged or omitted by his pleading. 2 Starkib on Ev. 29. So
Westfeldt, having stated in his declaration that Bliss endorsed the
note to him, is included by the above statement, and the defendant
could not be required to prove that fact.
7. The court erred, in charging that the burthen of proof was on
the defendant to show when and from whom plaintiff acquired the
note. The onus of proving this was on the plaintiff, because:
1. He had alleged in his declaration that he acquired it from Bliss,
who was a party to the chancery suit; 2. When a note is shown
to have been fraudulently or illegally put in circulation, it is on the
plaintiff to show how and when he acquired it. Thompson vs. Armstrong, 7 Ala. 256; Marston vs. .orward, 5 ib. 349; Boyd vs.
Mofvor, 11 ib. 822.
8. It is insisted, that the proof was sufficient and conclusive to
show that plaintiff acquired the note after ls pendens, and directly
or indirectly from a party.to the chancery suit; but if it -as npt,
there was certainly strong evidence to that effect; and if the evidence left that point doubtful, the court erred in taking the question
of faet from the jury, and charging that plaintiff was entitled to recover. It is only where there is no conflict or doubt in the evidence,
that the court can thus charge.
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P. Phillis,contra:
The fact that Westfeldt gave less than the amount due upon the
note, at the date of his purchase, does not divest him of the character of a bona fide holder. It is true, that decisions are numerous,
that when the note, tls between the maker and the payee, has no
real existence, so that the payee could not maintain a suit thereon,
a sale of the note for o less sum than is due upon it has been regarded as affected. by the statute of usury. But here the note has
a bona fide existence; it is founded upon a real transaction; and
Bliss, the payee, could have sued thereon. It was, therefore, as
much the subject of a sale, as chattels ordinarily are; and the price
paid for it concerned only the buyer and seller, and in no wise affected the character of the transfer. The necessities of commerce,
at a very early period, led to the use of bills of exchange. They
constitute the medium through which its vast operations are carried
on. Hence, in all civilized fhations, laws are passed inviting the
greatest confidence in their integrity. Such is the sanctity which
a wise policy has thrown around the bona fide holder of such .paper,
that his right thereto will be maintained, though he claims through
one who obtained it by " fraud, theft, or robbery." Roberson vs.
Smith, 18 Al. R. 220; 43 Law Library, Smith's Leading Cases, 362;
Burrows, 1527. In no other species of property can the owner be
deprived of his right by such means; nor a purchaser acquire a perfect title, from one who possesses none. Again; when such a paper
is sued on, it imports a consideration; and the holder is never called
on, even to prove how he acquired it, until the defefidant has- made
out a prima facie case, showing that the note had been obtained
from him, or'some intermediate party, by fraud or force; or that it
had been lost; or that it was originally infected with illegality.
Byles on Bills, 87.
The plaintiff in this case, occupying the position of a boia fide
holder, and the proof having gone further, in showing the time he
acquired it, and the consideration paid for it, the statute having
placed notes payable in Bank upon the same footing as bills of exchange, he could not be defeated-by any defence whatever.
While the defendant admits, that if the transfer had been the re-
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suit of robbery, the plaintiff would still have a good title, yet he
insists, that the filing of the bill in Sumter county, and the proceedings thereon, destroy his right. But it is denied that the rule of
lis pendens applies to negotiable paper.
The earliest trace of it is to be found in the comman law. In
Croke's Eliz. it is said, that after a writ in a real action is sued out,
he who purchases the estate is guilty of ehamperty, according to
the statute of Edward. Arundel vs. Arundel, p. 677. The rule
had no place in the.Equity Jurisprudence, until it was introduced
by Lord Bacon. Lord Bacon's Works, 12th rule. By reference
to the language of said rule it will be found to use the word "purchase," and from its whole tenor it will be seen to apply to cases
involving land bnly. All the authorities concur in the declaration,
that it was introduced in analogy to the rule at common law in a
real action. In one of the earliest cases appying this rule, it was
said by the Chancellor, that it had been suggested very'properly
that some plan should be adopted for making a register of all bills
involving the title to real estate, so that those who desired to purchase
lands, might have the means of ascertaining whether they were the
subject of litigation. Anonymous, 1 Yern. 818. Notwithstanding
the court, in this case, took time to consider,-nothing was done;
and purshasers of real estate in England remained subject to the
hazard of is pendens, until the 2d of Victoria; which enacts, that lis
.endens shall not operate as notice against purchasers, without being
properly registered. Quoted 71 Law Library, 143.
There is no case to be found in the English or American decisions where this doctrine has been extended to negotiable paper.
On the contrary, one of the ablest of English elementary writers
makes this emphatic declaration: "There is no case, in which
equity has determined the property of goods to be affected by reason
of a lis pendens, where possession is the principle evidence of ownership, as of personal chattels." 2 Powell on Mort. 616. And
Chancellor Kent who was disposed to extend the doctrine to bonds,
and choses in action not negotiable, says: " As to cash, or negotiable paper, not due, or perhaps movable personal property, such
as horses, cattle, grain, &c., I am not prepared to say, the rule is
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to be carried so far as to affect such sales. The safety of commercial dealing would require a limitation of the rule." Murray vs.
lilburne, 2 John. Chan. 444. There might be some reason in
applying the doctrine as Chancellor Kent proposed, to "choses in
action ;" for these, by the policy of the common law, were not assignable, and therefore the filing of the bill would give a right upon
the maxim "first in time, first in right." Co. Litt. 114; .linton
vs. Nrelmes, 13 Al. R. 227. For further references as to the origin of
this doctrine, and its application both in the courts of England and in
this country, see Murray vs. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 531 ; N'ewman vs.
Chapman, 2 Rand. 102; Murray vs. Blacekford, 1 Wend. 593;
Tongue vs. Morton, 6 Harris & J. 23; Brightman vs. Brightman,
1 Rhod. I. 120; Viner's Abrg. 15 vol. 128; letealf vs. Pulvertorft, 2 Yes. & B. 204; Colombus vs. Slim, 18 Eng. C. L. 436; Ze
Neve vs. Le Neve, Note, 71 Law Lib. 143.
It is not denied that chancery will entertain jurisdiction to enjoin
the transfer of a negotiable note, in proper cases, as was' quoted
from Story's Eq. Juris. and in the case from 1 Russ. But, if, in
defiance of the injunction, negotiable paper is transferred to a bona
fide holder, the only effect would be to give the complainant in the
bill the-redress to be found in the authority of the Court; to imprison
the defendant until he paid the amount of the note transferred, or
so much as would satisfy the complainant's demand, or to sequester
his estate. Johns vs. Davis, 2 Rob. Yirg. Rep. 729. And this is
all that is meant by the Lord Chancellor in the case from Russel,
when he speaks of the "more effectual remedy by injunction ;" and
it may be further remarked, that if the doctrine of lis pendens applied, there was no necessity for an injunction. But the Chancellor
says, that lis pendens was far from such a security as a prudent
man would desire to have. None of the cases cited by defendant go
further than to sustain the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery;
they do not declare that the negotiability of the instrument is thereby destroyed. In the case of Jervis vs. White, an injunction had
been granted against White; and a motion was made to extend it
to the defendant, Bolt, ;who had received, pending the injunction, a
bill from White, in the partnership'% name, for an individual debt
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of White to him. Mansfield, of counsel, contended upon the grossness of this case; and that the negotiation of this bill was a contempt; and that it was a case of lis pendens. Lord Eldon granted
the motion to extend the injunctidn, remarking, "I say nothing as
to the lis pendens applying to negotiable security," and the bill was
ordered to be deposited, to await the trial " upon the bonafides with
which Bolt received this bill." 7 Vesey, 413.
But suppose the doctrine to apply to negotiable paper, the burden
of proof was with the defendant, to show that Westfeldt obtained
the note from one of the defendants to this bill, and there is not
any proof of this. 5 Leigh, 664; Newman vs. Oapman, 2 Rand.
98; 6 B. Munroe, 446.
v The suit must also affect the estate, and not merely money secured
on it. It must act directly, and not collaterally. Wors]ey vs. Earl
Scarboro, 3 Atkyns, 892.
But even in cases where this doctrine has always been applied,
the rule laid down in Sorrell vs. Carpenterhas uniformly been acted
upon, to wit, that as "against a bona fide purchaser, who bought
pendente lite, without actual notice, the rule is considered a hard
case in equity; and although the court cannot refuse its aid against
him, yet the plaintiff is by no means a favorite; and, therefore, if
he make a slip in his proceedings, the court will not assist him to
rectify a mistake. 2 Pierre Wins. 482; Sugden on Vendors, 537,
183. In the bill filed by Smith & Hair, this note is misdescribed
in every particular, as to its date, the year in which it was payable,
the amount, and the endorsers. And the orders aind decrees all
refer to the note set out in the bill. The only instance to be found
in this State, where lis pendenswas held to be applicable to any but
real property, in the case of Bolling vs. Carter,where it will be
observed, that the point is neither made by counsel nor considered
by the court; but it was assumed to apply to a case of mortgagepf
a slave. 9 Al. R. 923.
There is still another ground fatal to the defence in this case,
even upon the supposition that the doctrine was applicable; and
that is, that the Court of Chancery of Sumter had no jurisdiction
over the non-resident defendants. Story's Eq. P1., § 81. The
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statute conferring jurisdiction, limits it to cases where the "transaction" &c., took place in this State. Eolman's Beirs vs. Bank
No7folk, 12 Al. R. 422 ; Glover vs. Glover, 16 Al. R. 447. There
is no statement in the bill which brings any of the absent defendants
within the limitations of the statute; an4 it is from an absent defendant it is alleged the plaintiff obtained the note. To provide for
the case where an absent or non-resident debtor had effects in this
State, a statute was passed in 1846, allowing attachments in chancery
to issue against debts, choses in action, &c. ; but it expressly provides that it shall not apply to any "debt due by bill of exchange,
draft or promissory note, negotiable and payable in Bank, and not
past due, or by bank check or certificate of deposit"
Pamphlet
Acts, 1846, p. 19. This jact is in perfect harmony with the argaments and decisions relied upon. For if the mere filing of a bill
would of itself create a lis pendens, and condemn the note, why object to its being attached ? The legislature has by this prohibition
vindicated the policy which gives the freest scope to commercial
transactions.
This objection is properly raised here; as the jurisdiction of a
court may be inquired into in every other court where the proceedings of the former are relied on, and offered by the party claiming
the 'benefit of such proceedings. Elliott vs. Pearsall,1 Pet. 841;
Lessee vs. Hickey, 3 How. 762.
It is insisted, however, that the decree destroyed the negotiability
of this note, and that it became a nullity from the time of its rendition. But the decree merely enjoins the defendants from receiving, transferring, &c., the debts mentioned in the bill, and orders,
"that the several debtors, parties defendants to this bill, pay over
to complainants, &c." There was no cancelation of the note, and
the only parties acted on were the defendants to the bill. Now,
Winston, who sets up this plea, was no defendant in that bill, and
is therefore not bound by that decree, or included in it.
Even if the decree had gone further, and acted upon the note
itself, this would not have been notice, so as to bind a subsequent
bona fide holder. 2 Sugden on Vend. 284. So, where a decree
had established that a certain slave was the separate property of a
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married woman, this was held to be no evidence, in a contest between
a creditor of the husband and the trustee of the wife. Branch Bank
vs. Hodges, 12 Al. R. 123.
Neither chancery decrees nor common law judgments, or executions issued thereon, so bind as to prevent the transfer of negotiable
paper to an innocent holder. So our attachments at common law
are held not to apply to negotiable paper. .Mills & Co. vs. Stewart,
12 Al. R. 96; Enos vs. Tuttle, 8 Conn. 27; 14 La. 452. And the
case of Dove vs. Dawson, which seemed to hold ihe contrary doctrine, was upon a note not negotiable. See Record Book, 20, 139;
6 Al. R. 713.
It is, therefore, evident that the charge of the court was more
favorable to the defendant below than the law justified. It admitted
the application of the doctrine to the case before the court, but
declared that there was no evidence to show that Westfeldt had
obtained the note from Murdock, after he had been made a party
to the bill. It will be seen that the only witnesses examined, Bliss
and Russell, give no evidence to this point. The former states that
he passed away the assets of the Bank to the assignees in March,
1848. The statement in the master's report is relied on, to show
that the note was in possession of Murdock after the filing of the
bill. But this inquiry was not referred to the master, and if it had
been, it is no evidence of the fact; as to this case, it would be "res
inter alios acta." The proceedings were evidence to show the pendency of the suit; but the fact stated in the answer or reports are
not evidence, but most be proved aliunde. Greenl. Evid. § 538-9;
Adams vs. MrclJillan, 7 Port. 84.
Again: judgments and decrees are evidence only against "parties
and privies." Westfeldt, it is admitted, is no "party;" and whether
he was a "privy" to the suit, is the point of litigation.
It is now upwards of two hundred years since Lord Bacon introduced this rule of lis pendens into the Chancery Court of England,
and no 'ase has yet been decided that invades the great policy
which everywhere has thrown its shield over commercial transactions. There is nothing to induce the belief that the Supreme
Court of Alabama will differ with the determination made by the
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learned Kent, that "the safety of commercial dealings requires a
- limitation of the rule."
GOLDTHWAITE, J.--The note sued on, at the time of the purchase
by Westfeldt, was the subjeet of controversy in the Chancery
Court; and the first question is, whether these proceedings operated
as notice to him; or, in .other words, does the doctrine of us pendent
apply to negotiable paper? This is entirely a new question with
us; and, so far as we can learn, has never been directly decided by
any Court. The doctrine as it prevails at this time, seems to have
had its origin in the common law rule which obtaified in real actions,
where, if the defendant aliened during the pendency of the suit, the
judgment in the real action overreached the alienation, and the
chancery ordinance of Lord Bacon, which provided "that no decree
bindeth any that cometh in bonafde by conveyance from the defendant, before the bill is exhibited, and is made no arty-by bill or
order; but when he comes in pendente lite, and while the suit is in
full prosecution, and without any color of allowance, or privity of
Court, there regularly thb decree bindeth. But if there were any
intermissions of suit, or the Court made acquainted with the conveyance, the Court is to give order upon the special matter according to justice." Lord Bacon's Works, 2 vol. 479.
From the use of the term "conveyance," we think that the framer
of this ordinance had in view its application to real property only,
and that it was intended simply to operate as an adoption in the
Court of Chancery of the common law rule which we have referred
to; and this idea is supported by Mr. Powell, who, in his work on
Mortgages, (2 vol. 618,) says: "There is no case in which equity
has determined the property in goods to be affected by reason of a
1is pendens, where possession is the principal evidence of ownership,
as of personal chattels." Chancellor Kent also, while he admits
that the rule is well established, and applies it without hesitation to
a sale of bonds and mortgages, as being- outside of the brdinary
course of traffic, and always uderstood to be subject to certain
equities, (Murray vs. Lilburn, 2 John. Ch. 441, 444,) expresses a
serious doubt whether it applies to money or commercial paper not

WINSTON vs. WESTFELDT.

due, and some question as to its application to movable personal
property-such as horses, cattle, grain, &c. The Vice Chancellor,
in Scudder vs. Van Amburgh, 4 Ed. 29, while he "inclines" to the
opinion that the rule applied to personal property, admits that the
question is not decided. In our own Court, in the case of Bolling
vs. Carter, 9 Ala. 921, the rule was applied to slaves; but the
weight of that case as authority is somewhat diminished, by the
fact, that the point was not made, and not alluded to by the Court.
It is, to say the least, highly improbable that a question of this novel
and important character should have passed "8ub silentio," had the
attention of the Court been directed to it.
The question though, here, is not whether the rule applies to personal property; but whether it holds as to negotiable paper transferred before maturity. Lord Eldon evidently doubted it in Jervis
vs. White, 7 Yes. 413, 414; and from the cautious manner in which
he expresses himself, in the last paragraph of Hood vs. Aston, 1
Russ. 412, more than twenty years afterwards, we do not think he
had fully resolved this doubt. The leaning of Chancellor Kent was
against it, on the ground that the safety of commercial dealing
required a limitation of the rule; and it must be acknowledged that
there is great force in the reason. Negotiable paper, representing,
as it does in almost all civilized nations, a very large proportion of
the commercial operations, and serving, to a great extent, as the
representative of money, is justly a favorite of the law, and enjoys
immunities and privileges which are extended to no other species
of contracts. The tendency of the Courts has been to uphold this
description of paper, in the hands of the bona fide holder, against
every species of defence which might exist as between the original
parties. The credit and confidence due to it must be impaired, if
the buyer was required to examine the courts of every county in the
State before he could be sure of his purchase ; and such would
necessarily be the case, if the doctrine of li pendens applied to it.
There are no adjudications to force us to this extremity; the strongest considerations of public policy seem to forbid the extension of
the rule to money or bank bills; and we think that commercial
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paper, as the representative of money, should stand on the same
footing in this respect.
Neither does the fact that an injunction against negotiating the
note was in force, destroy its negotiability. We do not understand
any of the authorities to go to that length; and the same reasons
exist to sustain it in the hands of a bona fide holder, as in the case
of i8 penden8. The party, it,. is tiue, would be placed by the
injunction in a better condition, as the Chancellor could commit for
the breach, until the party who negotiated the note had got it back
into his possession, or paid the amount due upon it; but the injunction could not operate to destroy the qualities which the law attaches
to the instrument itself.
It is, however, urged on the part of the plaintiff in error, that as
Westfeldt sues as the endorsee of Bliss, and the evidence shows that
he did not become the holder of the note until after the rendition of
the decree against Lacy, he is bound by it, as the privy of Bliss,
who was a party defendant to the chancery proceeding. It is true,
as a general rule, that a judgment or decree is binding on parties
and privies; but, technically speaking, there can be no privity,
where there is not an identity of interest. 1 Greenl. Ew; 523,'§
190. Uusually, as the assignde of a chose in action takes it subject
to all-the equities, he has precisely the samd interest as the assignor;
but this is not the case with negotiable paper, taken before maturity,
for value, and without notice. The holder, under such circumstances,
may have very different rights from the party from -Whom he
received it, and can recover while his assignor could not. This is
the case here. Neither Bliss nor Murdock could recover, because
they are not bona fide holders, while Westfeldt, upon the evidence,..
must be regarded as such; and in this respect, his interest is not
iden~tical with theirs, and he is not bound by the decree.
Our decision upon these points is conclusive of the case, and ren-.
ders it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions presented
in argument.
The judgmeht is affirmed.
GIBBONS, 3., not sitting.

EASTON'S ADMINISTRATOR vs. MORTON.

In .SuperiorCourt of Cincinnati, Ohio. June Term, 1854.
RUSSEL A. STEERE, ADMINISTRATOR OF B. G. EASTON Vs;
ELLIS AND MORTON.
1. The general role of the common law that the authority of the agent ceases -with
the death of the principal stated and affirmed.
2. The case of Cassiday vs. McKenzie, 4 Watts & Sergeant Rep. 282 commented on.
3. The only recognized exception to the general rule above stated, is where a power
is coupled with an interest, in which case it survives the person giving it and may
be executed after his death.
4. Where B. G. E. authorized by a simple memorandum in writing E. E. to sign.
checks in his name during his absence, and E. E. by virtue of such power, drew
three checks after the death of B. G. E. the agent acting bona fide and in ignorance of his principal's death; held, that his authority not being coupled with an
interest, expired with the death of the principal; and that the banker having paid
such unauthorized checks was still liable to the administrator of the decedent for
the sums so paid.

The facts fully appear in the opinion of the court.

J. Hf. C. Bonte & B. J. Henry, for Plaintiff.
]Yorthington

Mathew8, for Defendents.

GuOLSON, J.-This is an action of assumpsit brought by the Administrator of B. G. Easton deceased, against Ellis and Morton, to
recover the amount of three checks, drawn in the name of B. G.
Easton, after his death, by E. Easton. It is conceded that if there
was no authority to draw the checks, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover. The question whether there was such authority and
whether it continued after the decease of B. G. Easton, is the
matter in controversy which has been submitted to be tried by the
court.
The first proposition depends on the genuineness of the paper
offered in evidence, in these words:
Cincinnati, June 5, 1849.

Messrs. Ellis and Morton will be authorized to pay any checks

EASTON'& ADMINISTRATOR

Ts.

MORTON.

signed by E. Easton for me in my absence, and he will be fully
authorized to attend to all my business transactions with you.
(Signed)
B. G. EASTON.
Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances developed in
this case, and notwithstanding the opinion or belief to the conftrary,
of two witnesses acquainted with .the hand writing of B. G. Easton,
I find that he did execute the paper which has been read, and had
before his death authorized his brother E. Easton to sign for him
checks on the defendants. The grounds upon which this conclusion
has been reached need not be stated. Having arrived at the conclusion, that E. Easton had the requisite authority in the life-time
of B. G. Easton, the next .inquiry is, whether it continued after his
deatl.
The general rule of the common law, that the authority of the
agent ceases at the death of the principal is not disputed.. The rule
and the reasons for it have been distinctly recognized in Ohio.
"1Where delegated authority is exercised, it must be exercised in
the name of the principal. Where one acts as the attorney of,
another, the act should purport to be the act of the constituent."i
"As the act of the agent acquires validity, because it is the act of
the constituent, his power ceases when the capacity of the principal
ends." Lessee of Anderson vs. Brown, 9 Ohio, 151.
"It cannot be doubted that, as a general rule, the authority of
the attorney ceases upon the death of the principal. If, then, after
the death of the principal, the attorney makes an entry, it is done
without authority and of course void." Lessee of Wallace vs.
Saunders, 7 Ohio, I pt. 173; also 20 Ohio, 185; Wright, 594.
Under this rule of law, then, the authority of E. Easton to act
for .B.G. Easton, after his death cannot be maintained, unless the
case be embraced, as claimed by the defendants, under some recognized exception to the general rule.
At the time the defendants paid the checks they had no knowledge of the death of B. G.Easton. It would appear to be fair that
when one is vested with the authority of an agent to deal with a
blind person, such authority should be deemed to continue' so long
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as the party who acts or trusts on the faith of it remains uninformed
of a change. And we know that this rule is applied in some cases
of agencies, actual or implied, with much stringency.
It is upon this principle that the case of Cassidayvs. McKenzie,
4 Watts & Sergt. 282, appears to have been decided. That case
has been much pressed on my consideration in the argument, and
strongly sustains the ground taken for the defendants, that the
general rule as to the effect of the death of the principal on the
authority of the agent, does not apply in such a case as the present.
I find the law on this subject thus stated by Kent, 2 Com. 644.
In case of a lawful revocation of the power of the act of the principal, it is requisite that notice be given to the attorney, and all acts.
bona fide done, by him under the power prior to the notice of the
revocation, are binding upon the principal. This rule is necessary
to prevent imposition, and for the safety of the party dealing with
the agent; and it was equally a rule of the civil law. Even-if the
notice had reached the agent and he concealed the knowledge of
the revocation from the public, and the circumstances attending the
revocation were such that the public had no just ground to presume
a revocation, his acts done under his former authority would still
be binding upon his principal."
On a subsequent page (646) in the same volume, he says: "1By
the civil law and the law of those countries which have adopted the
civil law, the acts of an agent done bona fide after the death of the
principal, and before notice of his death, are valid and binding on
his representatives. But this equitable principle does not prevail
in the English law; and the death of the principal, is an instantaneous and absolute revocation of the authority of the agent unless
the power be conferred with an interest.
These remarks, the judge delivering the opinion in Cassiday vs.
McKenzie, refers to as the doubts expressed by Chancellor Kent,

and says that he cannot believe, notwithstanding those doubts, that
the common law is so unreasonable.
If the law be as stated by Kent, it is not for me to say whether
it be reasonable or unreasonable. Kent himself considers the rule
of the civil law to be more equitable; this may be so, but that does
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not make it our law. -It is my simple duty to find out if I can, and
declare what is the law on this subject.
The rule first quoted from Kent, requiring a notice of the revocation of the power to be given by the principal to the agent or attorney, has no application to such cases as the present. The responsibility of the principal which is imposed by that rule, is the result
,of his neglect of the duty which it imposes of giving notice. An'd
it will be found, generally, where the liability of a principal, in respect of the acts of an agent, continues after the relation has been:
determined, that it is confined to those cases where there is a duty
of giving notice imposed by law or the circumstances, and there is
a default in not so doing. Thus two men unite in a partnership
which constitutes. a mutual agency, on its dissolution, if no notice
be given, each will continue liable for any acts of the other in
respect of the same business. But that same partnership may em-,
ploy a clerk to transact their .general business, and thus give him
credit to buy goods, or even borrow money on their account, may
disbharge him from their employ, and without any notice to those
with whom they havb been dealing, their responsibility for his acts
ceases from the moment of his discharge.
There is a mutual agency created by a contract of. partnership,
and the rule that the death of one partner operates as an immediate
dissolution and termination of the agency, from the moment of
death, whether known or not, is laid down by a very high authority,
and seems to be opposed to the decision in 4 Watts & Serg., and
to sustain the distinctioh between the civil and common law as
stated by Kent.
-In Story on Partnership, (sec. 319,) it is said: "And here the
question may arise, as to the time from which the dissolution, by
the death of any partner takes effect, whether it be from the occurrence of that event, or from the period the other partners have
notice thereof. At the common law the doctrine seems clearly
established, that it takes effect in respect,' as well to the other partners, as to third persons from the time of death, without any consideration, whether they have notice thereof or not. Roman law,
on the other hand, pursued a differeit course, and as 'betweeff the
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partners themselves adopted the same rule which it applies to the
cases of agency or mandate; that is, the partnership is not dissolved
by the death of any partner, until the others have due notice
thereof."
I do not find that the decision in 4 Watts & Serg. has been sanctioned by other authorities, and do find respectable ones to the contrary, and some of them very directly in point, 2 Humph. 350 ; 10
N. Hamp. 156; 2 Green. 18. In some of the States the rule of the
civil law has been adopted by legislation. And this itself is good
authority to show that the common law was different.
The reasons for the general rule, that the authoritygiven by any
man ceases at his death, as found in Bunt vs. Rousemanier, 8.
Wheat. 174, aifd in the cases cited from our own reports, clearly
show to my mind that the question of notice or knowledge cannot
affect its opieration.
There is, however, one exception distinctly recognized in this
country, and -by the very language used in the authorities, any
other is excluded. It is thus-stated in 8 Wheaton 203:
"The general rule that a power ceases with the life of the person
giving it, admits of one exception. If a power be coupled with an
interest, it survives the person giving it, and may be executed after
his death."
And the only inquiry which remains, is whether the power in
this case was 'coupled with an interest, in the sense in which those
words are used. The meaning of those wordsis explained in several
cases. "1The interest which can protect a power after the death of
a person who creates it, must be an interest in the thing itself" not,
CC
an interest in that which is to be produced by the exercise of the
power," (8 Wheat.) It " must be" an interest in the thing itself
which is the subject of the power, and not in the proceeds or avails
of such thing,"' 7 Barbour. S. C.
In the present case, the money on deposit with Ellis and Morton
unquestionably, at the time the authority was given, was the individual propertyof B. G. Easton must be considered the thing which was
the subject of the power. It is clear to my mind that no interest
in that money passed to E. Easton. It may be that by the exercise

